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IS PREEMPTION RIGHT FOR YOU? THE THIRD CIRCUIT APPLIES
PREEMPTION TO A MISLEADING DRUG ADVERTISEMENT CLAIM
IN PENNSYLVANIA EMPLOYEE BENEFIT TRUST FUND v. ZENECA, INC.
I. DISCLAIMER: PRESCRIPTION DRUG ADVERTISEMENTS MAY CAUSE DEBATE
The daily flood of mass drug advertisements that appears across a
wide variety of media outlets makes it difficult to imagine a time when
commercials for Nexium, Lunesta and Viagra were not commonplace.' In
reality, it was only a decade ago that the Federal Drug Administration
(FDA) relaxed advertisement requirements, thus enabling direct-to-con-
sumer (DTC) advertisements to become widespread. 2 Today, information
1. See Francis B. Palumbo & C. Daniel Mullins, The Development of Direct-to-Con-
sumer Prescription Drug Advertising Regulation, 57 FooD & DRUG L.J. 423, 423 (2002)
(describing widespread use of direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertisements). In the
last decade, spending on DTC advertisements has grown at an accelerating rate.
See id. (discussing increase in DTC spending by year). The following chart illus-
trates the increase in DTC spending between 1989 and 2001.
Year DTC Spending
1989 $12 million
1992 $156 million
1995 $313 million
1998 $1.17 billion
2001 $2.38 billion
Id. (stating DTC spending amounts between 1989 to 2001). Nexium, Lunesta and
Viagra are among the ten most visible DTC brands, with combined DTC ad spend-
ing in television, magazines, newspapers, internet, radio and outdoor advertising
ranging from $411.5 million to $1.08 billion between 2002 and 2006. See Matthew
Arnold, DTC: The First 10 Years, MED. MARKETING & MARKET, Apr. 2007, at 37 (list-
ing top ten most visible DTC brands).
2. See generally Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 1, at 423-27 (providing histori-
cal overview of DTC prescription drug advertising). DTC advertising has techni-
cally been legal for years. See id. at 424 (discussing how first DTC prescription drug
advertisements appeared in 1981). In 1997, however, the FDA issued new guide-
lines that relaxed content requirements and facilitated the increase in DTC adver-
tisements. See Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Promotion of Prescription Drugs to
Consumers, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 498, 498 (2002) (explaining FDA's role in in-
crease of DTC advertising). Prior to 1997, broadcast DTC advertisements had to
provide all of the risk information associated with the prescription drug. See U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 7-8 (Oct. 2002), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03177.pdf [hereinafter PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1] (explain-
ing previous broadcasting requirements). This requirement caused broadcasting
to be unfeasible because it greatly increased the length of the broadcast. See id. at
8 (acknowledging impracticability of pre-1997 advertisement requirements). After
1997, however, the FDA presented pharmaceutical companies with alternatives for
fulfilling the regulatory requirements. See id. (describing methods of meeting reg-
ulatory requirements). For example, pharmaceutical companies could meet the
(743)
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is readily available at the click of a mouse or the flip of a channel, creating
great concern for the potential for dissemination of false or misleading
advertisements. 3 Indeed, despite the FDA's heavy regulation of drug ad-
vertisements, that concern has generated litigation under state consumer
protection acts (CPAs) for misleading or deceptive advertisements. 4
Recently, a debate has emerged over whether the states or the federal
government should be responsible for determining whether such drug ad-
vertisements are false or misleading.5 Specifically, courts are divided as to
risk requirement by "presenting the major side effects, either in audio or in audio
and visual form, and by telling consumers where to find additional information,
including how or where to obtain the approved product labeling." Id. (detailing
method of meeting regulation requirements).
3. Cf Joseph Winkler, You Wanted the Best, You Got the Best! The Current Direct-
to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertisement Dilemma, 26 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 331,
332 (Aug. 2007) (explaining how prior to prescription drug advertisements on
television and in magazines, consumers had to retrieve drug information from
their doctors). The practice of DTC advertising, permitted only in the United
States and New Zealand, has prompted great controversy. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT-
INC OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA's OVERSIGHT OF
DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 8 (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d0754.pdf [hereinafter PRESCRIPTION DRUGS II] (acknowledging limited
practice of DTC advertisements globally); PRESCRIPTION DRUGS I, supra note 2, at 1
(explaining controversy surrounding practice of advertising prescription drugs to
consumers). The United States Government Accountability Office explained both
sides of the debate:
Supporters of DTC advertising maintain that it educates consumers about
medical conditions and care options and that the increased use of pre-
scription drugs that DTC advertising encourages has improved the public
health. Critics of DTC advertising contend that it is sometimes mislead-
ing, leads consumers to seek prescription drugs when other treatments
may be more appropriate, and causes some patients to ask their physician
to prescribe new drugs that are more expensive but may not be more
effective than older drugs. Critics also argue that pharmaceutical compa-
nies spend too much money on drug promotion rather than on research
and development initiatives.
Id.
4. See, e.g., Pa. Employees Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 499 F.3d 239,
253 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that FDA regulations preempted consumer fraud
claim for misleading advertisements); Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1228,
1239 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (permitting plaintiff's consumer fraud claim that was based
on allegedly misleading advertisements to survive motion to dismiss); Adamson v.
Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d 496, 504 (D.NJ. 2006) (rejecting
claim under NewJersey Consumer Fraud Act because statements in drug advertise-
ments were not misleading); see also Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-
Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 48 (2005) ("Phar-
maceutical companies are also seeing their share of [Consumer Protection Act]
litigation despite the Food and Drug Administration's rigorous regulation of drug
advertising.").
5. See generally John Shaeffer, Prescription Drug Advertising-Should States Regu-
late What is False and Misleading?, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 629, 630 (2003) (arguing
that "FDA is the best judge of the veracity of prescription drug advertising"); Linda
A. Willett, Litigation as an Alternative to Regulation: Problems Created By Follow-on Law-
suits with Multiple Outcomes, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1477 (2005) (encouraging
state courts to give deference to FDA's role as regulator of prescription drugs). In
[Vol. 53: p. 743
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whether FDA regulations preempt state claims that are based upon both
"misleading" prescription drug advertisements and drug labeling accom-
panied by inadequate warnings.6 The recent proliferation of litigation
over the preemption of tort and fraud claims filed against drug manufac-
turers derives from the FDA changing its position on preemption.
7
Historically, federal safety regulations and common law tort princi-
ples were thought to operate concurrently with one another; however, this
notion changed in 2002.8 For the first time in its 100-year history, the FDA
addition, scholars have advocated other ways to decrease the dissemination of false
or misleading advertisements. See generally Marshall H. Chin, The Patient's Role in
Choice of Medications: Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Patient Decision Aids, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'v, L. & ETHICS 771 (2005) (promoting patient's active involvement in
regulating prescription drug advertisements); Winkler, supra note 3, at 331 (argu-
ing that DTC advertising should include disclaimer of superiority to lessen mis-
leading advertisements); see also Erin J. Asher, Comment, Lesson Learned from New
Zealand: Pro-Active Industry Shift Towards Self Regulation of Direct to Consumer Advertis-
ing Will Improve Compliance with the FDA, 16 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 599 (2006) (rec-
ommending regulation of misleading advertisements by self-regulatory private
sector).
6. See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 276 (3d Cir. 2008) (con-
cluding that FDCA impliedly preempted state law failure-to-warn claims); Desiano
v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that federal law
does not preempt state claims), affd sub nom. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S.
Ct. 1168 (2008) (per curiam); Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 318
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (concluding that Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) preempted
failure-to-warn claims); Prohias, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (finding preemption where
FDA approves label); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (determining that state law failure-to-warn claims are not pre-
empted); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 785-86 (E.D. La.
2007) (finding that doctrine of implied conflict preemption does not preempt
plaintiffs' state law failure-to-warn claims); Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
No. 1:04-cv-1748-DFH-WTL, slip op. at 10 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 19, 2007) (finding that
state law claims directly conflict with FDA's labeling requirements); Perry v. Novar-
tis Pharms. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 687 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (finding that federal
law did not preempt plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims where state law required addi-
tional warning because laws were not in conflict); Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F.
Supp. 2d 964, 967 (D. Neb. 2006) (declining to find implied preemption of state
law claims); Laisure-Radke v. Par Pharm. Inc., No. C03-365RSM, slip op. at 3 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 29, 2006) (rejecting implied preemption because there was no conflict
between state law and FDCA); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices &
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1699, slip op. at 10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) (holding
that FDA's labeling decisions preempt state consumer fraud actions where evi-
dence shows that FDA considered and rejected labeling issue raised on state law);
Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CGC-04-437382, slip op. at 6 (Cal. Super. Sept. 15, 2006)
(granting summary judgment for defendants because FDCA preempts failure-to-
warn claims).
7. See Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the
FDA, 48 B.C. L. Riv. 1089, 1094-95 (2007) (discussing shift in FDA's position on
preemption).
8. See Jack B. Harrison & Matthew J. Horwitz, Pursuing FDA Preemption: The
Supremacy Clause and State Tort Law, 1 OHio TORT L. J. 54, 54 (2006) (explaining
how tort law and FDA regulations complemented one another in order to provide
consumer protection); Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets
the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT LAw 1, 3 (2006) ("The relationship between tort
3
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took the position that its approval of prescription drug labeling and adver-
tisements preempted common law claims. 9 In addition, on January 18,
2006, the FDA asserted in its preamble to the prescription drug labeling
rule that "FDA approval of labeling under the act... preempts conflicting
or contrary State law."10 Since the FDA issued this Final Rule, courts have
struggled to determine whether to grant deference to the FDA's preemp-
tion position articulated in the preamble." Consequently, there has
arisen in federal courts a strong debate on both the proper role of federal
regulation in effectuating product safety and the application of implied
conflict preemption to conflicting state claims.1 2
law and the administrative state in the twenty-first century is likely to be far less
congenial than it was for much of the twentieth .... [This is because] develop-
ments in both areas increasingly cast the two less as complimentary [sic] regimes
than as institutional rivals."); Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 629 ("Courts have long
recognized that FDA and the States share responsibility for drug safety, and Con-
gress has not expressly preempted state action with respect to prescription drug
safety packaging, labeling, promotion, or advertising."); Catherine T. Struve, The
FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litiga-
tion, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 587, 587-90 (2005) (examining relation-
ship between tort system and FDA).
9. See Harrison & Horwitz, supra note 8, at 55 (summarizing position of FDA
and Daniel Troy, then-Chief Counsel for FDA, regarding preemption). In 2002,
FDA Chief Counsel Daniel Troy announced that permitting state judges and juries
to create additional burdens on manufacturers of medical drugs and devices con-
flicted with the FDA's role in determining product safety. See id. (explaining
Troy's rationale for preemption). In addition, the FDA promoted this position by
submitting amicus briefs in state law tort claims filed against drug or medical de-
vice manufacturers. See id. (citing Daniel E. Troy, IDA Involvement in Product Liabil-
ity Lawsuits, FDLI UPDATE 4, 7 (an./Feb. 2003)) (explaining FDA's involvement in
products liability lawsuits). For a detailed discussion of the amicus briefs filed by
the FDA, see Howard L. Dorfman et al., Presumption of Innocence: FDA's Authority to
Regulate the Specifics of Prescription Drug Labeling and the Preemption Debate, 61 FooD &
DRUG L.J. 585, 591-92 (2006).
10. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescrip-
tion Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933-3934 (Jan. 24, 2006)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601). In the preamble, the FDA ex-
plained its reasoning for adopting this position:
FDA believes that State laws conflict with and stand as an obstacle to
achievement of the full objectives and purposes of Federal law when they
purport to compel a firm to include in [drug] labeling or advertising a
statement that FDA has considered and found scientifically
unsubstantiated.
Id. at 3938.
11. Compare Sykes, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 317 (giving great deference to FDA's
preemption position), and Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526
(E.D. Pa. 2006) (same), affd, 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), with Vioxx, 501 F. Supp.
2d at 785-86 (determining that FDA preamble does not require deference), and In
re Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (same).
12. See, e.g., Sykes, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 318 (determining that FDCA preempted
failure-to-warn claim); Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (finding no conflict at motion to dismiss stage because "FDA recognizes that
FDA's regulation of drug labeling will not preempt all State law actions"); Zyprexa,
489 F. Supp. 2d at 277 (refusing to limit ability of courts in redressing injuries);
[Vol. 53: p. 743
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently ad-
dressed the preemption issue when it considered whether FDA regulations
preempted a consumer fraud claim in Pennsylvania Employee Benefit Trust
Fund v. Zeneca, Inc. 13 The Zeneca court held that implied conflict preemp-
tion existed because state consumer fraud laws posed an "obstacle to the
FDA's congressionally-mandated regulation of prescription drug advertis-
ing."14 In Zeneca, the Third Circuit became the first federal circuit court
to apply the FDA's preemption position to prescription drug advertising.1 5
This Casebrief explains the Third Circuit's recent determination that
FDA regulations preempt plaintiffs' state consumer fraud claims in pre-
scription drug cases.' 6 First, Part II explains the historical relationship
between federal and state regulation of prescription drug advertisements
leading up to the preemption debate. 1 7 In addition, Part II discusses the
Supreme Court's current approach in applying the preemption doc-
trine.18 Part III summarizes the facts and holding of Zeneca, and explains
the Third Circuit's reasoning for applying the FDA's preemption position
to prescription drug advertising.19 Part IV provides a guide for practition-
ers, by analyzing how Zeneca will impact pharmaceutical litigation in the
Third Circuit.20 Finally, Part V concludes by explaining that the Third
Circuit correctly determined that federal regulations preempt advertising-
based state consumer protection claims in order to further the FDA's pur-
pose of protecting the health and safety of consumers.2 1
Vioxx, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 781-82 (detailing role of federal government in regulating
prescription drugs).
13. 499 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating issue of case).
14. Id. at 247, 253. For a discussion of the holding and rationale of Zeneca, see
infra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
15. See Third Circuit Finds Preemption of Consumer Fraud Claims Challenging DTC
Ads Based Upon FDA-Approved Labeling, 34 DECHERT ON POINT (Dechert, Princeton,
N.J.), Aug. 2007, at 2, available at http://www.dechert.com/library/MassTorts_&_
ProdLiab_34_0807_ThirdCircuitFindsPreemption.pdf ("Zeneca is the first
court of appeals case to find consumer fraud claims preempted by FDA approval of
the statements in question.").
16. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's application of the FDA's preemp-
tion position to a consumer fraud claim, see infra notes 104-13 and accompanying
text.
17. For a discussion of the historical and modern relationship between fed-
eral and state regulation of prescription drugs, see infra notes 28-63 and accompa-
nying text.
18. For a discussion of modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, see infra notes
64-98 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Zeneca, see infra notes 99-113
and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of how litigators in the Third Circuit should address pre-
emption in light of Zeneca, see infra notes 122-44 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of why the Third Circuit was correct in holding FDA regu-
lations preempt consumer fraud claims, see infra notes 149-53 and accompanying
text.
2008]
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II. FOR YOUR INFORMATION: BALANCING FEDERAL AND STATE
REGULATIONS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution proclaims
that the laws of the United States are "the supreme Law of the land; . ..
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding."2 2 In theory, the Supremacy Clause invalidates all state laws
that conflict or interfere with an act of Congress.2 3 Nevertheless, federal
courts-in recognition of the states' historic police powers in regulating
health and safety-apply a presumption against the preemptive effect of
federal statutes and regulations. 24 Therefore, in order to find preemp-
tion, a court must find a congressional intent to preempt, called the "ulti-
mate touchstone" of the preemption analysis. 2 5 Congress can either
expressly or impliedly demonstrate its intent to preempt. 26 The Food,
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2.
23. See id. (establishing that Constitution, federal statutes and U.S. treaties are
"the supreme Law of the Land"); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 505,
516 (1992) ("Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause starts
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not to be
superseded by Federal Act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress.") (internal citations omitted).
24. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518 (explaining how express preemption state-
ments must be construed "in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of
state police power regulations"); see also Davis, supra note 7, at 1132-33, explaining:
The presumption against preemption maintains vitality particularly in
cases involving traditional areas of historic state power. The presumption
is especially forceful in implied conflict preemption doctrine because a
determination of actual conflict is intended to be a substitute for congres-
sional intent, and, because it is a weak substitute, the Court has been
careful to require strong, clear evidence of such conflicts.
Id. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,
53 UCLA L. REv. 1353, 1365-80 (explaining relationship between preemption doc-
trine and federalism). But see Dorfman et al., supra note 9, at 603 ("Where conflict
preemption is at issue, '[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not
material.., for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must
prevail."' (quoting Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union
Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 503 (1984))).
25. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S.
497, 504 (1978) (internal quotations omitted)). The Supreme Court in Barnett
Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson explained: "This question is basically one of
congressional intent. Did Congress, in enacting the Federal Statute, intend to ex-
ercise its constitutionally delegated authority to set aside the laws of a State? If so,
the Supremacy Clause requires courts to follow federal, not state, law." 517 U.S.
25, 30 (1996); see also Wilfred P. Coronato & Stephen Lanza, The Fracture that Will
Not Heal. The Landscape of Federal Preemption in the Fields of Medical Devices, Prescription
and Over-the-Counter Drugs Ten Years After Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, ALI-ABA 365, 367
(2005) (discussing how preemption doctrine does not apply without congressional
intent).
26. See Christine H. Kim, The Case for Preemption of Prescription Drug Failure-to-
Warn Claims, 62 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 399 (2007) (discussing law of preemption).
First, Congress can explicitly state and define the extent to which it intends to
preempt state law in the statute or regulation. SeeMedtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 484 (1996) (stating that preemptive language found in statute requires courts
only to identify "the domain expressly pre-empted" and not to determine whether
[Vol. 53: p. 743
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not contain an express preemption
provision applicable to prescription drugs; therefore, determining
whether Congress intended for the FDA prescription drug regulations to
preempt conflicting state claims has become the center of the debate. 2 7
A. Use Preemption Only as Directed
The FDA has been responsible for the federal regulation of prescrip-
tion drugs for over a century. 28 In 1906, Congress enacted the first federal
drug law, the Pure Food and Drug Act (PFDA),29 to ensure that only safe
and accurately labeled drugs were sold in interstate commerce.3 0 Initially,
pharmaceutical companies were not required to submit any information
Congress intended preemption); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (discussing how express
preemption does not require courts to infer congressional intent); Coronato &
Lanza, supra note 25, at 368 (explaining that express preemption provisions set
forth preemptive scope of legislation if they provide "reliable indication of con-
gressional intent"). In the absence of express preemptive language, congressional
intent to preempt can be implied by either field or conflict preemption. See Cipol-
lone, 505 U.S. at 516 ("In the absence of an express congressional command, state
law is preempted if [the] law actually conflicts with federal law or if federal law so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."). Under implied field pre-
emption, the regulation's scope indicates that Congress intended to occupy an
entire field of regulation and has left no room for states to supplement the federal
law. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947) (explaining
that where acts of Congress "touch a field in which the federal interest is so domi-
nant[,] .. . the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject"). Implied conflict preemption occurs when compliance
with both state and federal law is impossible or "where state law stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64-65 (2002) (internal quo-
tations omitted); see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (explaining how implied conflict
preemption renders state law without effect when state law conflicts with federal
law).
27. Compare Pa. Employees Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 499 F.3d 239,
253 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding congressional intent to preempt because Congress
gave FDA exclusive authority), with Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85,
95 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to find congressional intent where Congress has not
made "explicit expression of intent").
28. Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, §§ 1-13, 34 Stat. 768 (1906)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1934)). See generally John P. Swann, History of the
IDA, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/fulltext.html (last
visited Nov. 24, 2008) (examining history of FDA).
29. Pure Food and Drug Act, §§ 1-13 (1934) (setting forth drug labeling re-
quirements). The Pure Food and Drug Act, which created the FDA, "limited the
agency's regulatory reach to preventing untruthful labeling, promotion, and adver-
tising of food and drugs." Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 630.
30. See Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 years, FDA
CONSUMER MAGAZINE 2 (Jan.-Feb. 2006) available at http://www.fda.gov.fdac/fea-
tures/2006/106cder.html (explaining early federal requirements for pharmaceuti-
cal companies). See generally Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 630-33 (detailing evolution
of federal drug regulation with respect to advertisements); Swann, supra note 28, at
2 (describing origins of federal drug regulation).
7
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to the FDA before marketing a drug.3 ' In fact, "[t] he burden of proof was
on the [federal] government to show that a drug's labeling was false and
misleading before it could be taken off the market." 32 In addition, states
retained the power to protect their citizens from false or deceptive con-
duct with respect to food and drugs sold in interstate commerce.
3 3
Over the years, the FDA's regulatory authority over drug safety and
promotion expanded.34 Congress, cognizant of the states' historical po-
lice powers, was careful not to upset the harmonious relationship between
state and federal regulations.3 5 For example, when Congress enacted the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938, it determined that a pri-
vate right of action for damages was "unnecessary" because a "common law
right of action exists."3 6 Nonetheless, the FDCA greatly extended the
FDA's control over drug manufacturers by requiring manufacturers to
show that a drug was safe and to submit a marketing application to the
FDA before placing the drug on the market.
37
Congress did not expressly address the relationship between state and
federal regulations in enforcing drug regulations until the adoption of the
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA) of 1966.38 Under the FPLA,
"Congress specifically provided that States could not enforce different or
less stringent laws with respect to disclosures of quantity on the label of
any food, drugs, or cosmetic. '39 In 1976, when Congress enacted the
Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the FDCA, Congress explicitly ad-
dressed the states' regulatory powers in enforcing such regulations.
40
31. See Meadows, supra note 30, at 2 (explaining marketing requirements
under PFDA).
32. Id.
33. See Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 634 (explaining states' historic roles in regu-
lation of prescription drugs).
34. See generally Davis, supra note 7, at 1100-08 (describing how FDCA in-
creased labeling requirements over years); Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 630-37 (ex-
plaining expansion of FDA regulation over prescription drug advertising).
35. See Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 633-37 (noting Congress's continuous adop-
tion of "harmonization" language in federal drug amendments).
36. Louis M. Bograd, Taking on Big Pharma-and the FDA, 43 TRIAL 30, 30 (Mar.
2007) (quoting Hearing on S. 1944 Before the S. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Commerce,
73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 400, 403 (1934)); see also Leslie C. Kendrick, FDA's Regulation
of Prescription Drug Labeling: A Role for Implied Preemption, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 227,
238 (2007) ("When Congress first enacted the FDCA in 1938, it considered a pro-
posal to include in the statute a private cause of action for injury caused by prod-
ucts regulated by the act. Congress rejected the proposal precisely because state
common law already provided such a cause of action.").
37. See Meadows, supra note 30, at 2 (explaining impact of FDCA of 1938 on
drug manufacturers).
38. See Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 635 (explaining Congress's continued use of
"harmonization language" in its subsequent amendments).
39. See id. at 634.
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1) (2006) (limiting states' enforcement and regu-
lation of medical devices); see also Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 634 (explaining how
language in MDA differed from other express preemption legislation).
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Under the MDA, Congress expressly precluded states from enforcing any
requirements "which were different, from or in addition to, any require-
ment" of the MDA.
41
In 1997, Congress enacted the Food and Drug Administration Mod-
ernization Act (FDAMA) .42 Similar to the MDA, the FDAMA expressly
precluded states from regulating the packaging and labeling of nonprescrip-
tion drugs.4 3 Although Congress enacted a national uniform system of
regulation under the FDA, it still envisioned the states playing a vital role
in the enforcement of nonprescription drug regulations. 44 Thus, Con-
gress provided that the FDAMA did not preempt state product liability
claims or false advertising claims not related to product safety for nonpre-
scription drugs.4 5 Specifically, Congress stated that although the FTC is
responsible for the regulation of nonprescription drug advertisements,
"advertising issues relating to claims substantiation, fair balance, and mis-
leading or deceptive claims are outside the scope of the preemption" un-
less they conflict with or frustrate federal regulations.46  Congress,
however, did not include a comparable provision regarding the preemp-
tion of prescription drug advertisements. 47 Thus, courts are left to deter-
mine congressional intent when applying the preemption doctrine to
prescription drug advertisement cases.48
41. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (2006). But see 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (2008) (provid-
ing exemptions from federal preemption of state and local medical device require-
ments). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the express
preemption in the MDA, see infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
42. See Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2297 (1997) (amending FDCA).
43. See 21 U.S.C. § 379r(a) (2006) (prescribing national uniformity for regula-
tion of prescription drugs) (emphasis added); see also Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 635
(discussing effect of FDAMA on nonprescription drugs).
44. See H.R. RaP. No. 105-399, at 103 (1997) (Conf. Rep.) ("The scope of
national uniformity is modified to only apply to state requirements that relate to
labeling and packaging or, if they go beyond labeling and packaging, to require-
ments relating to warnings. Thus, advertising issues relating to claims substantia-
tion, fair balance, and misleading or deceptive claims are outside the scope of
preemption."). Significantly, the FTC, not the FDA, is responsible for regulating
nonprescription drug advertisements. See 36 Fed. Reg. 18, 539 (Sept. 16, 1971)
(designating responsibility to FTC).
45. See 21 U.S.C. § 379r(e) (2006) ("Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to modify or otherwise affect any action or the liability of any person under
the product liability law of any State.").
46. H.R. REP. No. 105-399, at 103.
47. Cf 21 U.S.C. § 379r(e) (2006) (preempting state regulations of nonpre-
scription drugs); 21 U.S.C. § 379s (2008) (restricting states from regulating differ-
ent or additional labels for cosmetics).
48. See, e.g., Pa. Employees Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 499 F.3d 239,
253 (3d Cir. 2007) ("By specifically excluding advertisements covered by 21 U.S.C.
§ 352(n) and the regulations promulgated thereunder from the scope of 15 U.S.C.
§ 52, Congress signaled its intent to give the FDA exclusive authority to regulate
prescription drug advertising."); Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85,
95 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to find preemption because to do so "would be hold-
ing that Congress, without any explicit expression of intent, should nonetheless be
taken to have modified (and, in effect, gutted) traditional state law duties between
20081
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B. Warning! Broadcasting this Advertisement May Subject You to Common
Law State Fraud Claims
Today, through its Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER),
the FDA oversees advertising, marketing and promotional materials relat-
ing to prescription drugs.49 In order to ensure that pharmaceutical com-
panies provide accurate and truthful advertisements, the FDA has enacted
precise and detailed regulations. 50 Specifically, the FDA regulates not
pharmaceutical companies and their consumers"); see also Shaeffer, supra note 5, at
636 (distinguishing legislative history regarding prescription drugs and nonpre-
scription drugs). Shaeffer explained:
It is a supportable conclusion that, because it excluded prescription
drugs, Congress did not intend to preempt state regulation of the label-
ing, packaging, promotion, or advertising of prescription drugs. Such a
construction, however, is not appropriate here. The legislative history in-
dicates that Congress would be willing to extend similar-if not
broader-federal superiority with respect to prescription drugs.
Id.
49. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) (explain-
ing role of Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) in regulation of
prescription drugs). Specifically, the mission statement of CDER's Division of
Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communication (DDMAC) states:
To protect the public health by assuring prescription drug information is
truthful, balanced and accurately communicated. This is accomplished
through a comprehensive surveillance, enforcement and education pro-
gram and by fostering better communication of labeling and promo-
tional information to both health care professionals and consumers.
Id. Originally, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was responsible for regulat-
ing prescription drug advertisements. See generally Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 630
(outlining transfer of regulation of prescription drug advertising from FTC to
FDA). In 1938, Congress enacted the Wheeler-Lea Act, which gave the FTCjuris-
diction over unfair and deceptive advertising of food, drugs and cosmetics. See id.
(explaining effect of Wheeler-Lea Act). The FDA, on the other hand, was respon-
sible for regulating labeling and branding. See id. (describing division of responsi-
bility between FDA and FTC in regulating prescription drugs). In 1938, Congress
enacted the FDCA and expanded the FDA's role by requiring drug companies to
retain FDA approval prior to marketing the drug. See Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301) (setting forth marketing require-
ments for drug manufacturers). In 1962, Congress expressly transferred this re-
sponsibility to the FDA under the Kefauver-Harris Amendments. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 393(b) (1) (2006) ("The [FDA] shall ... promote the public health by... taking
appropriate action on the marketing of regulated products in a timely manner
. . . . .).
50. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2006) (prohibiting "misbranding" of pre-
scription drug advertisements); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2008) (detailing requirements
for prescription drug advertisements). The recent Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007 provides:
[I]n the case of an advertisement for a drug . . . presented directly to
consumers in television or radio format and stating the name of the drug
and its conditions of use, the major statement relating to side effects and
contraindications shall be presented in a clear, conspicuous, and neutral
manner.
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
85, § 901 (d) (3) (A), 121 Stat. 823, 940 (2007) (emphasis added). Moreover, the
[Vol. 53: p. 743
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss4/5
CASEBRIEF
only what information can be included in an advertisement, but also the
method of presentation. 51 For example, all advertisements must contain a
"brief summary relating to side effects, contraindications, and effective-
ness."5 2 Although the FDA can regulate the advertisement itself, Con-
gress, concerned with First Amendment issues, has expressly precluded
the FDA, except in extraordinary situations, from enacting regulations
that would require pre-approval of any advertisement. 53 Thus, the FDA
only requires submissions for approval for any promotional material pre-
pared in connection with the launch of any new drug or label change.
54
Although the FDA retains exclusive federal authority over regulating
prescription drug advertisements, states have assisted the FDA in the en-
forcement of these standards.55 Specifically, states have provided citizens
with a private right of action against pharmaceutical companies for false
or misleading advertisements under state consumer protection acts
(CPAs).56 The elements necessary to bring a CPA claim vary from state to
FDA regulations provide that an advertisement is considered false, lacking in fair
balance or misleading if it "[c]ontains a representation or suggestion, not ap-
proved or permitted for use in the labeling, that a drug is better, more effective,
useful in a broader range of conditions." See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (6) (i). Further-
more, the act specifically penalizes any party who disseminates false or misleading
direct-to-consumer advertisements by imposing a civil penalty of up to $250,000 for
the first violation in any three year period, and $500,000 for any subsequent viola-
tions within the three year time period. See 21 C.F.R § 901(d) (4) (g) (1) (2008)
(setting forth penalties).
51. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Pre-
scription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3960 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) ("[S]tatements made in promotional
labeling and advertisements must be consistent with all information included in
labeling under proposed 201.57(c) to comply with current 201.100(d)(1)."). See
generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2008) (setting forth requirements for prescription drug
advertisements); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e) (7) (viii) (2008) (detailing manner in which
advertisements should be presented).
52. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e)(1) (2008).
53. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(j)(4) (2008) ("Any advertisement may be submitted
to the Food and Drug Administration prior to publication for comment.") (em-
phasis added). See generally Shaeffer, supra note 6, at 642-43 (discussing First
Amendment considerations involved in regulation of prescription drug
advertisements).
54. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(j) (1) (2008) (listing circumstances requiring ap-
proval by FDA prior to market dissemination); see also Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 632
(explaining difference between FDA pre-approval of labeling and drugs).
55. See Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 629 (discussing relationship between FDA
and states in regulating and enforcing prescription drug advertising).
56. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 15-16 (providing historical de-
velopment of CPAs). During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of states concerned
with the dissemination of misleading and false advertisements enacted state con-
sumer protection acts (CPAs), modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTC Act). See id. at 15 (explaining enactment of CPAs). The CPAs, designed
broadly to prohibit conduct that is "unfair" or "deceptive," provided consumers
with a private right of action. See id. at 17 (setting forth elements necessary for
bringing private claim). The FTC, envisioning CPAs as complementary to the fed-
eral laws in place, welcomed and encouraged states to adopt CPAs. See id. at 16
2008]
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state; however "CPAs often do not explicitly require the traditional ele-
ments of common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, such
as reliance, intent, injury, and damages." 57 Therefore, plaintiffs' attorneys
are able to bring claims that have a lower burden of proof than typical
common law tort claims.
58
The majority of states, cognizant of the important balance between
state and federal regulation, have inserted "safe harbor" provisions in their
CPAs. 59 The safe harbor provisions "defer to the expertise of state and
(discussing historical relationship between FTC and state consumer protection act
laws). Today, every state has enacted one or more statutes to protect consumers.
SeeJoseph J. Leghorn et al., Defending an Emerging Threat: Consumer Fraud Class Ac-
tion Suits in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Products-Based Litigation, 61 FooD &
DRUG L.J. 519, 519 (2006) (discussing development of state consumer protection
statutes).
57. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 3.
58. See Leghorn et al., supra note 56, at 519 (explaining difference between
traditional products liability claims and consumer fraud actions).
59. See id. at 522 (explaining widespread use of safe harbor provisions in
CPAs). The majority of state CPAs specifically exempt acts that are regulated by,
authorized by or in compliance with regulations of a federal government agency.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-106 (2007) ("This article does not apply to
[c]onduct in compliance with the orders or rules of, or a statute administered by, a
federal, state, or local governmental agency"); FLA. STAT. § 501.212 (2007) ("This
part does not apply to... [a]n act or practice required or specifically permitted by
federal or state law."); GA. CODE. ANN. § 10-1-374 (West 2007) ("This part does not
apply to . . .[clonduct in compliance with the orders or rules of or a statute ad-
ministered by a federal, state, or local governmental agency."); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 48-605 (2007) ("Nothing in this act shall apply to [a]ctions or transactions per-
mitted under laws administered by the state public utility commission or other
regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the
United States."); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-6 (West 2007) ("This chapter does not
apply to an act or practice that is: (1) required or expressly permitted by federal
law, rule, or regulation; or (2) required or expressly permitted by state law, rule,
regulation, or local ordinance."); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.176(2) (West 2007)
("KRS 367.175 shall not apply to activities authorized or approved under any fed-
eral or state statute or regulation."); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 3 (West
2006) ("Nothing in this chapter shall apply to transactions or actions otherwise
permitted under laws as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting
under statutory authority of the commonwealth or of the United States."); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.904(1) (a) (West 2007) ("This act does not apply to ...
[a]ct or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory
board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United
States."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.46 (West 2004) ("Sections 325D.43 to 325D.48
do not apply to conduct in compliance with the orders or rules of, or a statute
administered by, a federal, state, or local governmental agency."); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 598.0955 (LexisNexis 2007) ("Consumer Protection Act shall not apply to
actions or transactions otherwise permitted, prohibited, or regulated under laws
administered by the Director of Insurance, the Public Service Commission, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or any other regulatory body or officer
acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States."); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 598.0955 (2007) ("The provisions of NRS 598.0903 to 598.0999, inclusive,
do not apply to [c]onduct in compliance with the orders or rules of, or a statute
administered by, a federal, state or local governmental agency."); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-12-7 (West 2008) ("Nothing in the Unfair Practices Act shall apply to actions
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federal government agencies by exempting regulated conduct from the
CPA, particularly when the conduct is explicitly authorized by law."60 Al-
though some states have specifically provided an exemption for advertise-
ments that are subject to and comply with FTC regulations, no state has
provided a similar exclusive provision for FDA regulations.6 1 Thus, a
or transactions expressly permitted under laws administered by a regulatory body
of New Mexico or the United States, but all actions or transactions forbidden by
the regulatory body, and about which the regulatory body remains silent, are sub-
ject to the Unfair Practices Act."); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.12 (West 2008)
("Sections 1345.01 to 1345.13 of the Revised Code do not apply to [a]n act or
practice required or specifically permitted by or under federal law, or by or under
other sections of the Revised Code .... "); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 646.612 (West
2007) ("ORS 646.607 and 646.608 do not apply to [c]onduct in compliance with
the orders or rules of, or a statute administered by a federal, state or local govern-
mental agency."); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-13.1-4 (2007) ("Nothing in this chapter shall
apply to actions or transactions permitted under laws administered by the depart-
ment of business regulation or other regulatory body or officer acting under statu-
tory authority of this state or the United States."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40 (2007)
("Nothing in this article shall apply to [a]ctions or transactions permitted under
laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory author-
ity of this State or the United States or actions or transactions permitted by any
other South Carolina State law."); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 37-24-10 (2007) ("Nothing
in this chapter shall apply to acts or practices permitted under laws of this state or
the United States or under rules, regulations, or decisions interpreting such
laws."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-111(a) (2007) ("The provisions of this part do
not apply to [a]cts or transactions required or specifically authorized under the
laws administered by, or rules and regulations promulgated by, any regulatory bod-
ies or officers acting under the authority of this state or of the United States.");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-22(1)(a)(2007) ("This act does not apply to an act or
practice required or specifically permitted by or under federal law, or by or under
state law."); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.86.170 (West 2008) ("Nothing in this
chapter shall apply to actions or transactions otherwise permitted, prohibited or
regulated under laws administered by the insurance commissioner of this state, the
Washington utilities and transportation commission, the federal power commis-
sion or actions or transactions permitted by any other regulatory body or officer
acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States .... "); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 40-12-110 (2007) ("Nothing in this act shall apply to ... [a]cts or
practices required or permitted by state or federal law, rule or regulation orjudi-
cial or administrative decision.")
60. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 31.
61. See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1523 (2007) ("Nothing contained in
this article shall apply to any advertisement which is subject to and complies with
the rules and regulations of, and the statutes administered by the federal trade
commission."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-101 (2007) ("This chapter does not apply to
[a]dvertising or practices which are subject to and which comply with any rule,
order, or statute administered by the Federal Trade Commission."); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(b) (2008) ("This section shall not apply ... [t]o any advertise-
ment which complies with the rules and regulations, of and the statutes adminis-
tered by, the Federal Trade Commission."); IOWA CODE § 714.16 (2008) ("Nothing
herein contained shall apply to any advertisement which complies with the rules
and regulations of, and the statutes administered by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1406 (2006) ("The provisions of this Chapter
shall not apply to . . . [a]ny conduct which complies with section 5(a) (1) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)], as from time to time
amended, any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder and any finally adjudi-
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problem arises where the advertisement complies with FDA regulations
but does not fall within the "safe harbor" provision. 62 Currently, there is
an intense debate about whether this problem can be solved by applying
the implied preemption doctrine to prescription drug advertisements.
63
C. Ask the Supreme Court if Preemption is Right for You
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address whether the implied
preemption doctrine applies specifically to FDA approved pharmaceutical
drug labeling and advertisements, it has provided some guidance over the
years on the application of the preemption doctrine.64 The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the MDA's express preemption provision in Med-
tronic v. Lohr6 and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.66 is important because it first
recognizes and then applies preemption to common law tort claims in the
device industry. 67 In addition, the Supreme Court's holdings in Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co.68 and Buckman v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee 9 pro-
vide guidance for courts struggling with the application of the implied
preemption doctrine in light of the FDA's current views on preemption.
70
cated court decision interpreting the provisions of said Act, rules and regula-
tions."); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 350-d (McKinney 2007) ("In any such action it shall
be a complete defense that the advertisement is subject to and complies with the
rules and regulations of, and the statutes administered by the Federal Trade Com-
mission or any official department, division, commission or agency of the state of
NewYork."); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(b) (Vernon 2003) ("Nothing in
this subchapter shall apply to acts or practices authorized under specific rules or
regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission .... The provisions of
this subchapter do apply to any act or practice prohibited or not specifically au-
thorized by a rule or regulation of the Federal Trade Commission. An act or prac-
tice is not specifically authorized if no rule or regulation has been issued on the act
or practice.").
62. See Pa. Employees Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 499 F.3d 239, 253
(3d Cir. 2007) (analyzing whether CPA safe harbor for ETFC regulations extends to
FDA regulations).
63. See Leghorn et al., supra note 56, at 523 ("[T]rial judges appear to find
CPA harbor provisions to be a more palatable basis for dismissing some, if not all,
of a plaintiff's CPA claims without affirmatively invoking the preemption doctrine
that many find unpersuasive.").
64. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on implied pre-
emption, see infra notes 77-102 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, will address the issue next term in Levine v. Wyeth. See 944 A.2d 179 (Vt.
2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008). For a discussion of Levine v. Wyeth, see
infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
65. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
66. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
67. See id. at 1006 (determining MDA preempts common law claims that im-
pose different or additional requirements); see also Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487 (explain-
ing possibility of statute preempting common law damages claims). For a further
discussion of Riegel and Lohr, see infra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
68. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
69. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
70. See id. at 350 (illustrating how state claims can stand as obstacle to flexibil-
ity built into FDA's regulatory process); see also Geier, 529 U.S. at 883 (recognizing
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Specifically, Geier addresses the amount of deference to be afforded to an
agency's position when applying the preemption doctrine, although not in
the prescription drug context. 71 Moreover, the Court's analysis in Buck-
man recognizes the conflict between the FDA's regulatory regime and state
tort law. 7
2
1. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
In both Lohr and Riegel, the Supreme Court addressed whether the
express preemption provision provided in the MDA preempted state tort
claims. 73 In Lohr, the Court considered whether the MDA preempts state
tort claims for injuries related to medical devices approved under the
510(k) process.7 4 The 510(k) process permitted medical devices to be ap-
proved by a pre-market notification process, allowing approval if a device
was substantially equivalent to one currently on the market.75 The de-
fendants, Medtronic, argued that the express preemption provision found
in MDA preempted any common law state claims. 76 Focusing on legisla-
tive history and the statute's language, the Court determined that not all
common law state claims were precluded. 77 The Court concluded, how-
importance of agency opinions in determining scope of preemption doctrine in
complicated federal regulations).
71. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 883-87 (giving deference to agency views). For a
discussion of Geier, see infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
72. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347-48 (analyzing implied conflict preemption as
it relates to FDA regulations). For a further discussion of Buckman, see infra notes
92-98 and accompanying text.
73. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1006 (2008) (concluding that
MDA preempts common law claims that impose different or additional require-
ments); see also Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996) (explaining possibility
of statute preempting common law damages claims). The express preemption in
the MDA provided that:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement:
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or
effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a require-
ment applicable to the device under this chapter.
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 481-82 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)).
74. See id. at 474 (evaluating whether MDA "pre-empts a state common-law
negligence action against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective medical
device").
75. See id. at 478-79 (discussing approval of medical devices under 510(k)
process).
76. See id. at 486-87 (setting forth defendant's preemption argument).
77. See id. at 487 (finding Medtronic's argument "not only unpersuasive but
implausible"). In Medtronic, the Supreme Court refused to grant "complete immu-
nity from design defect liability to an entire industry." Id. The Court determined
that "at least some common law claims against medical device manufacturers may
be maintained after the enactment of the MDA." Id. at 491. Specifically, the Court
concluded that Congress's use of the terms "additional" or "different" require-
ments in the MDA did not manifest an intent to preclude all state tort claims. Id.
(interpreting congressional intent).
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ever, that state 510(k) processes "escape[ ] preemption" because "their
generality leaves them outside the category of requirements that express
preemption provision envisioned to be 'with respect to' specific devices." 78
After Lohr, a majority of circuit courts determined that express pre-
emption was applicable if the device was subject to the premarket approval
process. 79 Under the premarket approval process, the FDA subjects the
device to a "rigorous" process and only approves the device if there is a
"reasonable assurance" of the device's "safety and effectiveness. '" 80 In Rie-
gel, the Supreme Court endorsed the majority view and held that the MDA
preemption clause "bars common-law claims challenging the safety and
effectiveness of a medical device given premarket approval" by the FDA.8 1
In Riegel, the plaintiffs alleged that the catheter inserted into the patient's
coronary artery was "designed, labeled, and manufactured in a manner
that violated New York Common Law." 82 The Supreme Court found that
a "State tort law that requires a manufacturer's catheters to be safer, but
hence less effective, than the model the FDA has approved disrupts the
federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same effect" and
thus preemption was appropriate. 83 The Court emphasized, however, that
the express preemption provision did not "prevent a State from providing
a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations;
the state duties in such a case 'parallel,' rather than add to, federal
requirements."8 4
2. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
Recently, the Court addressed whether to apply deference to an
agency position in a products liability claim.85 In Geier, the Supreme
Court found that a federal safety standard promulgated by the Depart-
78. Id. at 502.
79. See, e.g., Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc., 405 F.3d 421, 424 (6th Cir. 2005) (hold-
ing that FDA's regulation of medical devices subject to premarket approval process
gave rise to preemption); Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 179-80 (3d Cir.
2004) (same); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 585 (5th Cir. 2001) (reaf-
firming that "medical device manufacturer's compliance with the FDA's PMA pro-
cess will preempt state tort law claims brought with respect to that approved device
and relating to safety, effectiveness or other MDA requirements when the substan-
tive requirements imposed by those claims potentially conflict with PMA ap-
proval"). But see Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1382 (11th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that "FDA's approval of a medical device pursuant to the PMA pro-
cess, standing alone, imposes no specific federal requirement applicable to a par-
ticular device and, therefore, has no preemptive effect under section 360k(a) of
the MDA").
80. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1004 (2008).
81. Id. at 1007.
82. Id. at 1004-05 (stating plaintiffs claims).
83. Id. at 1008.
84. Id. at 1011.
85. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883-87 (2000) (applying
deference to views of Department of Transportation in its preemption analysis).
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ment of Transportation under the Motor Safety Vehicle Act preempted a
state negligence claim.8 6 The safety standard required that some, but not
all, automobiles contain passive restraint devices, such as airbags.8 7 The
plaintiff sued the automobile manufacturer after an accident, alleging that
the lack of a driver-side airbag amounted to a negligent or defective prod-
uct design.
8 8
Although the Motor Vehicle Safety Act contained an express preemp-
tion provision stating that the federal standard preempted state or local
safety standards, its effect on common law tort claims was removed be-
cause of a "savings" clause 8 9 Nevertheless, the Court found the common
law claims impliedly preempted because they conflicted with the federal
regulation by standing as "an obstacle to the gradual passive restraint
phase-in that the federal regulation deliberately imposed." 90 In determin-
ing the statute's preemptory scope, the Supreme Court placed weight on
the agency's interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the importance of
the agency's views in the preemption analysis. 9 1
3. Buckman v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee
Next, in Buckman, the Supreme Court found that the FDAC, as
amended by the MDA, impliedly preempted the plaintiffs "fraud-on-the-
FDA" claim.92 In Buckman, the plaintiffs claimed injuries from the implan-
tation of orthopedic bone screws into their spines. 93 Specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged that the consultant company that assisted the manufac-
86. See id. at 865 (holding that federal standard preempts common law tort
claim).
87. See id. at 864-65 (noting that safety standard under Act required some
vehicles to be equipped with restraints).
88. See id. at 865 (explaining facts of case).
89. See id. at 867-68 (employing narrow reading of preemption provision to
find not all common law torts claims preempted). The "savings" clause in the Mo-
tor Vehicle Safety Act stated that "'[c]ompliance with' a federal safety standard
'does not exempt any person from any liability under common law."' Id. at 868
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988 ed.)).
90. Id. at 881.
91. See id. at 883-87 (considering views of Department of Transportation in its
preemption analysis). The Supreme Court explained its reasons for placing
weight on the agency's interpretation of the statute:
Congress has delegated to DOT [the Department of Transportation] au-
thority to implement the statute; the subject matter is technical; and the
relevant history and background are complete and extensive. The agency
is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and its
objectives and is "uniquely qualified" to comprehend the likely impact of
state requirements.
Id. at 883.
92. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff's Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 343 (2001) (de-
termining that "fraud-on-the-FDA" claims are preempted). The FDCA prohibits
manufacturers from "the making of a knowingly false statement in any statement,
certificate of analysis, record, or report required or requested under section
381(d) (3) of this title ...." See 21 U.S.C. § 331(w) (2008).
93. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 344 (describing nature of plaintiff's claims).
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turer in receiving FDA approval made fraudulent representations to the
FDA that played a substantial role in their injuries.9 4 The Supreme Court
determined that federal regulations impliedly preempted "[p]olicing
fraud against [a] federal agency."9 5 The Court reasoned that implied con-
flict preemption "stems from the fact that the federal statutory scheme
amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the [FDA],
and that this authority is used by the [FDA] to achieve a somewhat delicate
balance of statutory objectives." 9 6 In addition, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the possibility of implied preemption under the FDA's regulatory
regime by acknowledging the increased burden pharmaceutical compa-
nies would face in "complying with the FDA's detailed regulatory regime
in the shadow of the fifty states' tort regimes." 97 Recently, however, the
Supreme Court, in a four-to-four decision, limited Buckman by affirming
an appeals court ruling that a "fraud on the FDA" exception to drug man-
ufacturer immunity statutes was not preempted by Buckman.9 8
III. ACCEPTING THE RISKS: THE THIRD CIRCUIT APPLIES PREEMPTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA EMPLOYEE BENEFIT TRUST FUND V. ZENECA, INC.
A. Facts and Procedural Background
Although no other circuit court has yet to address whether FDA regu-
lations preempt consumer fraud claims, the Third Circuit in Zeneca re-
minded consumers and practitioners that the FDA-and not the states-is
responsible for regulating misleading drug advertisements.9 9 In 2005,
Pennsylvania Employee Benefit Trust Fund and two private plaintiffs
jointly filed a putative class action against Zeneca alleging deceptive mar-
94. See id. (same).
95. Id. at 347.
96. Id. at 341.
97. Id. at 350; see also Leghorn et al., supra note 6, at 524-25 (discussing impact
of Buckman on implied preemption arguments).
98. SeeWarner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (per curiam) (dis-
cussing scope of Buckman), affg Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 87
(2d Cir. 2006). Desiano involved a challenge to legislation enacted in Michigan
that provided drug manufacturers with immunity from products liability lawsuits
where the FDA had approved the drug at issue, except where the manufacturer
had defrauded the FDA. See 467 F.3d at 86-87 (explaining facts of case); see also
MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.2946(5) (2007) (explaining requirements for drug manu-
facturers to receive immunity). The Second Circuit found that under the rationale
of Buckman, "the Michigan immunity exception is not prohibited through preemp-
tion." Desiano, 467 F.3d at 98. The Supreme Court, after the excusal of Chief
Justice Roberts, upheld the decision with no opinion, due to a 4-4 tie. See Warner-
Lambert Co., 128 S. Ct. at 1168 (affirming lower court's decision).
99. See Pa. Employee Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 499 F.3d 239, 251-52
(3d Cir. 2007) ("[T] he purpose of protecting prescription drug users in the FDCA
would be frustrated if states were allowed to interpose consumer fraud laws that
permitted plaintiffs to question the veracity of statements approved by the FDA.").
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keting campaign of the drug Nexium. °0 0 The plaintiffs alleged that
Zeneca committed unlawful advertising under the Delaware Consumer
Fraud Act (DCFA) and violated the consumer protection statutes of all
fifty states for false, misleading and deceptive advertising. 10 1 Specifically,
the plaintiffs claimed that Zeneca's promotional campaign for Nexium,
consisting of physician-directed marketing and direct-to-consumer adver-
tising, was misleading because it incorrectly represented that Nexium was
superior to Prilosec, another drug manufactured by Zeneca. 10 2 The dis-
trict court granted Zeneca's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim;
Employee Benefit subsequently appealed.10 3
B. The Third Circuit's Analysis
1. The Majority Opinion
In a two-to-one decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.' 0 4 Judge Smith found
that the appeal in Zeneca presented two important issues: (1) whether the
DCFA exemption for advertising regulated by the FTC extended to FDA
regulations; and (2) whether federal law preempted the plaintiffs' state
consumer protection claims. 10 5 The Third Circuit rejected the district
100. See id. at 241 (stating facts of Zeneca). The drug Nexium treats acid re-
flux disease and heartburn. See id. (discussing medical use of drug). The Penn-
sylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund was joined in the action by two private
plaintiffs, Joseph McCraken and Linda Watters. See id. at 240.
101. See id. at 241-42 (setting forth plaintiffs' claims). The Delaware Con-
sumer Fraud Act's (DCFA) purpose is to "protect consumers and legitimate busi-
ness enterprises from unfair or deceptive merchandising practices in the conduct
of any trade or commerce in part or wholly with this State." 6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 2512 (2008). The DCFA forbids the use of deception, fraud, misrepresenta-
tion or omission of a material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of
any merchandise, regardless of whether the person has actually been misled,
deceived or damaged. See id. § 2513(a), invalidated by State ex rel. Brady v. Pre-
ferred Florist Network, Inc., 791 A.2d 8, 20 (Del. Ch. June 07, 2001) (finding
DCFA provision unconstitutional). The DFCA, however, included an exemption
clause which stated that "[t]his section shall not apply ... [t]o any advertisement
or merchandising practice which is subject to and complies with the rules and
regulations, of and the statutes administered by, the Federal Trade Commission."
Id. § 2513(b) (2). In addition, the plaintiffs brought claims alleging unjust enrich-
ment and state claims under Delaware common law for restitution, disgorgement
and constructive trust and negligent misrepresentation. See Zeneca, 499 F.3d at 241-
42 (setting forth plaintiffs' claims).
102. See id. (describing plaintiffs' claims).
103. See id. at 242 (setting forth procedural history of case).
104. See id. at 253 (affirming decision of United States District Court for Dis-
trict of Delaware that claims under state consumer protection laws were pre-
empted by federal law). Circuit Judge Smith delivered the opinion of the court
and was joined by Judge Siler, Senior CircuitJudge for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. See id. at 240. Judge Cohen
provided the dissenting opinion. See id. at 253 (Cohen, J., dissenting) (opining
that federal regulations do not preempt state claims because there is no conflict).
105. Id. at 241.
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court's broad interpretation that the DCFA exemption provision included
the rules and regulations administered by the FDA. 10 6 The court, how-
ever, affirmed the district court's conclusion that "Nexium advertisements
that complied with the FDA-approved label were not actionable under the
state consumer protection laws because those laws were preempted by fed-
eral law."10 7 The majority determined that "[t]o allow generalized state
consumer fraud laws to dictate the parameters of false and misleading ad-
vertising in the prescription drug context would pose an undue obstacle to
both Congress's and the FDA's objectives in protecting the nation's pre-
scription drug users."10
8
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Third Circuit placed great
emphasis on the FDA's purpose when determining whether to preempt
the claim. 10 9 Specifically, the court interpreted Lohr and Geier as "sug-
gesting that state laws are preempted when they frustrate regulations that
have been promulgated following a specific inquiry into a particular area
of agency authority."' 10 In addition, the court reasoned that although the
FDCA was not a "critical element" like the plaintiff's claim in Buckman, the
state claims here would "unnecessarily frustrate the FDCA's purpose and
FDA regulations, as the extent of agency involvement in regulating pre-
106. Id. at 253 (declining to extend DFCA exemption to FDA regulations and
rules). After carefully examining the relationship between the FTC and FDA, the
Third Circuit determined that the FDA is primarily responsible for prescription
drug advertisements. See id. at 243 (analyzing responsibilities of FDA and FTC in
regulating prescription drug advertisements). The Third Circuit explained:
Reading the exemption in Sec 2513(b) (2) to exclude from the scope of
the DCFA marketing practices that are subject to the rules and regula-
tions of the FDA, and which are required to be based on labeling that is
expressly approved and required by the FDA, improperly broadens the
reach of the exemption beyond its explicit limitation to practices that are
compliant with FTC rules and regulations. We will not rewrite the text of
the exemption to include regulation of activities that are not within the
FTC's authority.
Id. at 246-47.
107. Id. at 247 (affirming district court's implied conflict preemption analysis
and conclusion).
108. Id. at 253.
109. See id. at 249-51 (discussing and applying Supreme Court precedent).
The Third Circuit explained its reliance on Supreme Court precedent when deter-
mining deference to FDA:
Medtronic and Geier suggest the sort of confluence between congressional
purpose and agency purpose that had previously been recognized in Fidel-
ity Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta: 'Federal regulations have
no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes. Where Congress has di-
rected an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are sub-
ject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his
statutory authority or acted arbitrarily.'
Id. at 250 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,153-
54 (1982)) (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 250 (citing Kendrick, supra note 36, at 240-41).
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scription drug advertising is extensive and specific.""' The court ex-
plained that where the:
FDA approved-labeling is the basis for the allegedly fraudulent
representations made in prescription drug advertising ... the
purpose of protecting prescription drug users in the FDCA would
be frustrated if states were allowed to interpose consumer fraud
laws that permitted plaintiffs to question the veracity of state-
ments approved by the FDA.
1 12
Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that the FDA regulations pre-
empted the plaintiff's state fraud claims.' 1 3
2. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Cohen criticized the majority for "ignor[ing] the
teaching of the Supreme Court's decisions which enjoin seeking out con-
flicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists.""14
Judge Cohen disagreed with several components of the majority's ratio-
nale that consumer fraud laws stand as an obstacle to the federal regula-
tion in prescription drug advertisements. 1 5 First, Judge Cohen opposed
the "majority's heavy reliance upon the high level of specificity in the fed-
eral regulations as a basis for a finding of preemption."" 6 Next, Judge
Cohen found that Congress's purpose would not be frustrated because the
FDA had not determined the "veracity" of the statement in the advertise-
ment at issue.' 17
111. Id. at 251.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 253 ("Accordingly, the state consumer fraud laws are pre-
empted by the extensive federal legislative and regulatory framework.").
114. Id. at 253 (Cohen, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Judge Co-
hen, applying the presumption against preemption and the conflict analysis, deter-
mined that preemption was not applicable. See id. at 253 (disagreeing with
majority's determination of preemption).
115. See id. at 254-59 (setting forth points of disagreement with majority
opinion).
116. Id. at 254-60. According to Judge Cohen, "it is well-established that a
preemption inquiry 'cannot be judged by reference to broad statements about the
comprehensive nature of federal regulations.'" Id. at 254 (quoting Head v. N.M.
Bd. Of Exam'rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1963)).
117. See id. at 255-56 (declining to find frustration of purpose). Judge Cohen
explained:
In summary, because the FDA has not approved or disapproved the verac-
ity of the advertising statements that plaintiffs challenge in this case, and
plaintiffs' particular challenge does not question the veracity of any state-
ments in the labeling approved by the FDA, there is no likelihood that
plaintiffs' claims would conflict with the FDA's responsibility in protect-
ing prescription drug users.
Id. at 256.
21
Rabeh: Is Preemption Right for You - The Third Circuit Applies Preemptio
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
In addition, the dissent declined to find a congressional intent to pre-
empt state consumer fraud laws.'18 Moreover, the dissent criticized the
majority's broad reading of Buckman to find in favor of preemption.' 1 9
Lastly, the dissent argued that state law parameters for false advertisement
are parallel and not in conflict with FDA determinations.1 20 Judge Cohen
concluded by noting that "Congress's failure to provide a private remedy
for persons injured by false and misleading advertisements further con-
vinces me that the state law remedies are not preempted."'' 1
IV. SIDE EFECrs: HOW ZENECA WILL IMPACT THE USE OF PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
The Third Circuit's acceptance of the implied conflict preemption
doctrine in Zeneca was a big win for drug manufacturers nationwide. 122
Not only did the Third Circuit shut the door on state law deceptive adver-
tising claims, but it opened the door for even greater use of the implied
preemption doctrine. 123 For example, in April 2008, the Third Circuit
extended the use of the preemption doctrine in Colaccio v. Apotex124 to a
consolidated appeal grounded on whether FDA approval of a label pre-
empted a failure-to-warn products liability claim.' 25 In Colaccio, the Third
Circuit determined that the FDA's continued public rejection of a
stronger warning preempted a plaintiffs failure-to-warn claims. 126
118. See id. (finding "exclusion of prescription drug advertisements from cov-
erage under the federal statute does not approach the required 'clear and mani-
fest' congressional purpose to preempt state law" (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
119. See id. at 256-57 (differentiating Buckman because there was "no cited risk
that the availability of state-law remedies would conflict with a particular federal
objective or a careful balancing interests that the federal government has achieved
in policing prescription drug advertising").
120. See id. at 257-58 ("I cannot agree that the mere presence of state law
standards for false and misleading advertisements would present a conflict with the
federal law.").
121. Id.
122. For a discussion of the holding and rationale of Zeneca, see supra notes
99-121 and accompanying text.
123. See Jason A. Leckerman, Tipping Point? The Third Circuit Rules that IDA
Regulations Preempt Consumer Protection Claims Attacking Prescription Drug Advertise-
ment, PROD. LiAB. & MASS TORT GROUP NEWS (Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll,
LLP, Bait., Md.), Sept. 19, 2007, at 2, 3, available at http://www.ballardsphahr.
com/files.tbl sslNewsletters/PDFFiles42/1081/9-18-07ProductLiability.pdf ("Al-
though claims alleging deceptive drug advertising have been relatively uncommon,
the [Zeneca] opinion could have a profound effect on pharmaceutical litigation in
the Third Circuit, as well as other jurisdictions.").
124. 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008).
125. See id. at 271 (concluding FDCA impliedly preempted state law failure-to-
warn claims).
126. See id. (explaining holding of case).
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The debate over preemption of tort and fraud claims, however, is far
from over. 127 In fact, on January 18, 2008, the Supreme Court granted
certiori to Levine v. Wyeth,128 another preemption case. 129 In Levine, the
Court will review a Vermont Supreme Court decision, which found that
FDA regulations do not preempt a failure-to-warn products liability
claim.130 The Court's decision in this case will greatly impact the use of
the preemption doctrine generally and will provide circuit courts with ad-
ditional guidance when applying the implied conflict preemption
doctrine. 1 3 1
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical companies in the Third Circuit, armed
with the Zeneca and Colacicco decisions, should continue to assert the pre-
emption defense for fraud and tort claims. 13 2 Litigators defending phar-
127. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Why the PDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A
Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagared, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 3
(2006) (advocating preemption where agency "undertakes its authorized compre-
hensive review"), with Kendrick, supra note 36, at 247 (arguing that preemption
applies to claims but is more limited than FDA asserts in preamble), andJonathan
V. O'Steen & Van O'Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the Argument Against Federal
Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective Drugs, 48 A~iz. L. REv. 67,
93-95 (2006) (determining that preemption should not be applied to prescription
drugs because of policy reasons).
128. 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008).
129. See Wyeth, 128 S. Ct. at 1118 (granting certiori and requiring petitioner to
file brief by Feb. 25, 2008).
130. See Levine, 944 A.2d at 194 (determining that failure-to-warn claim was
not preempted by federal law). In Levine, the plaintiff brought negligence and
failure-to-warn claims, alleging that Wyeth was negligent in providing adequate
warnings of the dangers of injecting the drug Phenergan directly into a patient's
vein. See id. at 182 (explaining facts of case). Although the FDA had rejected a
stronger warning, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected the defendant's preemp-
tion argument. See id. at 183-84 (describing court's conclusion). The court rea-
soned that the defendants could have "warned against IV-push administration
without prior FDA approval . . . because federal labeling requirements create a
floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation." Id. at 184.
131. For a discussion of the preemption issues presented in Levine, see supra
notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
132. See Karen Barth Menzies, Focus on Facts to Defeat Preemption, 43 TRIAL 44,
44 (March 2007) (explaining that "preemption attack.., is a win-win proposition
for the defendant"). Menzies explained that "[i]f the attack fails, the defendant
has lost nothing-it is simply in the same position it was before filing the motion.
And if the attack succeeds, the defendant avoids having to submit to potentially
damaging discovery, or more significant, any rulings on the merits of the plaintiff's
claims." Id. at 45. The doctrine of preemption is asserted as an affirmative defense
to state law claims. See Stephen Torline & Derek Teeter, Federal Preemption in Prod-
ucts Liability Case, 76 J. KAN. B. Ass'N. 32, 33 (July-Aug. 2007) (explaining use of
preemption as affirmative defense). The party seeking to use preemption as a de-
fense bears the burden of both overcoming the presumption against preemption
and affirmatively establishing preemption. See id. (commenting that substantial
burden often requires use of "canons of statutory construction to convince the
court of the preemptive effect of federal law"). Therefore, in the context of FDCA
preemption, pharmaceutical companies have the burden of establishing conflict
preemption. See Leghorn et al., supra note 56, at 523 (discussing use of preemp-
tion doctrine under FDCA in motions to dismiss).
2008]
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maceutical companies against claims similar to the fraud claim presented
in Zeneca should emphasize the significance that the Third Circuit placed
on the FDA's specific and detailed advertising regulations.' 33 By compar-
ing the specificity of the FDA regulations to the general state claims, liti-
gators can illustrate how the state claim directly conflicts with the FDA
regulations.1
34
In addition, pharmaceutical defense attorneys should use the broad
language in Zeneca favoring preemption to argue preemption of tradi-
tional products liability claims filed against their clients. 13 5 Defense attor-
neys should focus on arguing that any common law claim based on FDA
approval labels should be preempted because it frustrates the FDA's pur-
pose. 13 6 Litigators should highlight how extensive FDA regulation of la-
beling and approval of drugs is even more detailed than its regulation of
advertisements. 137 Therefore, the FDA's purpose in regulating prescrip-
tion drugs would be "frustrated" if the states demanded a warning that the
FDA did not find substaritiated.1 38 In addition, pharmaceutical compa-
nies should continue to employ additional safeguards to shield themselves
from liability for false or misleading advertisements.' 39 For example, drug
manufacturers should take extra care to comply with FDA regulations and
take the precaution of having their advertisements pre-approved by the
FDA. 1 40
133. See Pa. Employees Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 499 F.3d 239, 251-
52 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasizing specificity and details of FDA regulations regard-
ing prescription drug advertisements).
134. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1011 (2008) (highlighting
importance of specific federal regulations for finding preemption).
135. See Zeneca, 499 F.3d at 251 ("An even stronger case for preemption oc-
curs when FDA-approved labeling is the basis for allegedly fraudulent representa-
tions made in prescription drug advertisement."); see also Third Circuit Issues
Expansive Preemption Ruling, PHARMACEUTICAL & MED. DEVICE LITIG. ALERT (Shook,
Hardy & Bacon, LLP), Sept. 28, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.shb.com/
fileUploads/pharmaalert-092807_1944.pdf (noting Zeneca's importance because it
"speaks of implied preemption in broad terms-suggesting that the defense may
apply to other state law claims as well").
136. See Zeneca, 499 F.3d at 244 (explaining strong correlation between drug
labeling and marketing); see also 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e) (4) (i) (a) (2008) ("The adver-
tisement shall present information from labeling, required, approved, permitted,
or granted in a new-drug ... application . . .relating to each specific side effect
and contraindication in such labeling that relates to the uses of the advertised
dosage form(s) ....").
137. See Dorfman et al., supra note 9, at 611 ("Given the rigorous process in-
volved in label approval, preemption is a reasonable response to this conflict. Ac-
cordingly, FDA's policy of preemption is both within its broad statutory mandate
and a reasonable accommodation to address a conflict of policies affecting its abil-
ity to fulfill that mandate.").
138. See Zeneca, 499 F.3d at 251 (explaining how state imposed claims would
frustrate FDA's purpose).
139. See Menzies, supra note 132, at 45 (highlighting importance of seeking
FDA approval of asserting preemption defense).
140. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(j) (4) (2008) (permitting submission to FDA for
prior approval); see also Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1232 (S.D. Fla.
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Although the pharmaceutical company's use of the preemption doc-
trine prevailed in the Third Circuit on a consumer fraud and failure-to-
warn claim, plaintiffs can still defeat the preemption defense for other
state claims by employing various strategies. 14 1 First, it is important for
plaintiffs' attorneys to distinguish their claims from the claims presented
in Zeneca and Colacicco.142 For example, consumer fraud claims based on
deceptive advertising actions like the one asserted in Zeneca are "much
more regulatory than compensatory in nature, and the regulatory compo-
nent is much more likely to conflict with FDA action.' 4 3 In contrast, tort
litigation provides compensatory relief and serves as "an important means
for the identification and dissemination of new information concerning
product risk.' 44 Second, given the important role of tort litigation in pro-
moting product safety, practitioners should advocate for courts to apply
the presumption against preemption and find against preemption. 14 5
2007) (refusing to bar misleading advertisement claims where there was no evi-
dence that advertisements were approved or viewed by FDA).
141. See Michael K. Brown et al., Bi-Annual Update Regarding Pharmaceutical
Drug and Prescription Device Federal Preemption: Breaking Developments from the Supreme
Court and More, PROD. LtA. UPDATE (Reed Smith LLP, L.A., Cal.), Oct. 2007, at 7,
available at http://www.reedsmith.com/_db/_documents/0710prodliab.pdf
(commenting on how "many courts remain skeptical of implied preemption in
drug product liability cases and many decline to defer to the FDA's views of pre-
emption .... "); see also Menzies, supra note 132, at 45 ("Plaintiff's [sic] should still
argue that federal law does not preempt their state law claims as a matter of law,
but now the argument may be strengthened by factual evidence-of what a federal
agency did or failed to do-gleaned through discovery to help plaintiffs defeat
preemption claims.").
142. See generally Menzies, supra note 132, at 45 (advising plaintiff's attorneys
to utilize factual evidence to defeat motion to dismiss on grounds of preemption).
143. Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 644-45 (explaining difference between decep-
tive advertising claims and products liability claims). Shaeffer explained:
Courts achieve consistency between FDA's approval of a prescription
drug and certain physical injury tort actions in decisions that find that
States' additional safety requirements are not inconsistent with FDA regu-
lation. Private false advertising claims involving prescription drugs are dif-
ferent, however; it is more likely that state regulation of prescription drug
advertising, which includes private tort claims, will not only conflict with
federal objectives but also will unreasonably and directly burden inter-
state commerce. An impermissible conflict would exist if States were per-
mitted to determine that advertisements found not deceptive under
FDA's regulations could still deceive consumers. Conflicts necessarily
arise when juries empanelled to decide a private dispute find that a par-
ticular prescription drug advertisement is deceptive-and ban its use in a
State-when the advertisement was prepared in a manner consistent with
FDA regulation.
Id. at 629.
144. Nagareda, supra note 8, at 5-6, 17 (explaining value of "information up-
dating" coming from tort litigation). But see Willett, supra note 5, at 1486-88 (dis-
cussing negative impact of pharmaceutical litigation).
145. For a discussion of the presumption against preemption, see supra note
25 and accompanying text; see also Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State
Autonomy, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' PowERs, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 250
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) (advocating for "strengthening
20081
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Lastly, plaintiffs' attorneys should focus on how the Third Circuit limited
the holding in Colacicco to cases "in which the FDA has publicly rejected
the need for a warning that plaintiffs argue state law requires." 146
V. PREEMPTION RESULTS NOT TYpicAL
The Third Circuit's opinion in Zeneca is important to the current de-
bate regarding the use of preemption in prescription drug cases because it
marks the first time that a circuit court has applied the FDA preemption
position.14 7 Although the Zeneca decision preempted consumer fraud
claims based on deceptive advertising practices, the preemption doctrine
may not have the same success when applied to other state claims.1 48 The
full impact of the Zeneca decision and its application to other state claims
will depend heavily on the outcome of Levine v. Wyeth, which is currently
pending before the Supreme Court. 149 Meanwhile, litigators on both
sides of the debate will continue to concentrate on the similarities and
differences of the claims in order to win their cases. 150
Although the Zeneca rationale in favor of preemption may not be ex-
tended to other common law claims, the Third Circuit correctly con-
cluded that the FDA's regulatory authority preempts advertising-based
doctrinal limits on federal preemption by reviving the traditional presumption
against preemption and developing rules to limit which federal actors can preempt
state law").
146. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008).
147. See Chilton D. Varner et al., Trends in US Product Liability Litigation, in
PLC CROSS-BORDER HANDBOOKS: LiWE SCIENCES HANDBOOK 2007/08 93, 95 (Stuart
Fellows ed., 7th ed. 2007), available at http://apps.kslaw.com/Library/publica-
tion/PLCLifeSciencesProductLiabilityTrends.pdf (discussing importance and im-
plications of Zeneca on future cases in Third Circuit).
148. See, e.g., Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir.
2006) (finding that federal law does not preempt state claims), cert. granted sub
nom. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2007), affd, 128 S. Ct. 1168; In
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (determin-
ing that state law failure-to-warn claims are not preempted); In re Vioxx Prods.
Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 785-86 (E.D. La. 2007) (finding that doctrine of
implied conflict preemption does not preempt plaintiffs' state law failure-to-warn
claims); Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 967 (D. Neb. 2006) (declining
to find implied preemption of state law claims). But see, e.g., Colacicco, 521 F.3d 253
(concluding that FDCA impliedly preempted state law failure-to-wam claims);
Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1234-35 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding
preemption where FDA approves label); In re Bextra & Celebrex Marketing Sales
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1699, 2006 WL 2374742, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 16, 2006) (holding that FDA's labeling decisions preempt state consumer
fraud actions where evidence shows that FDA considered and rejected labeling
issue raised on state law).
149. For a discussion of Wyeth v. Levine, see supra notes 128-30 and accompa-
nying text.
150. See generally Menzies, supra note 132, at 45 (noting that success of pre-
emption claim depends upon factual claims asserted).
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state consumer protection claims.' 51 Historically, state and federal regula-
tions were thought to complement one another; however, the increasing
scope and specificity of federal regulation has challenged the states' roles
in enforcing federal prescription drug advertising regulations. 152 The de-
bate about whether states or the federal government should determine if
advertisements are false or misleading should be resolved in favor of pre-
emption. 153 If states and juries were permitted to determine whether an
advertisement was misleading or deceptive, the FDA's purpose in protect-
ing the health and safety of prescription drug users would be frustrated. 154
The Third Circuit's finding in favor of preemption of drug advertisements
is best suited to ensure that drug manufacturers comply with a uniform
national regulatory standard that determines whether or not advertise-
ments are misleading or deceptive.' 5 5 Thus, the preemption doctrine
151. For a discussion of the holding in Zeneca, see supra notes 104-14 and
accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of the historical relationship between the federal and
state governments, see supra notes 28-49 and accompanying text.
153. See generally Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 630 (arguing in favor of preemp-
tion of prescription drug advertisements). Shaffer explained:
Unlike the perceived "peaceful coexistence" between a state-based com-
pensatory system for physical injury and FDA's regulation of the safety
and efficacy of prescription drugs, state action relating to prescription
drug advertising necessarily will conflict with FDA's role. If FDA is the
best judge of the veracity of prescription drug advertising, that agency's
determination should hold sway, and courts should not let state regula-
tion become an obstacle.
Id.; see also W. Wylie Blair, Implied Preemption of State Tort Law Claims Against Prescrip-
tion Drug Manufacturers Based Upon FDA Approval, 27J. LEGAL MED. 289, 301 (2006)
(suggesting amendment to FDCA to include express preemption clause).
154. Cf Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008) (explaining
how "tort law, applied byjuries under a negligence or strict-liability standard, is less
deserving of preservation"). Justice Scalia explained the problems underlying a
jury determination of the safety of a medical device:
A state statute, or a regulation adopted by a state agency, could at least be
expected to apply cost-benefit analysis similar to that applied by the ex-
perts at the FDA: How many more lives will be saved by a device which,
along with its greater effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm? Ajury,
on the other hand, sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is
not concerned with its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits
are not represented in court.
Id.
155. For a discussion of the majority's holding in Zeneca, see supra notes 105-
14 and accompanying text; cf. Shaeffer, supra note 5, at 648 ("Our federal system
does not permit one State to decide for the nation when an advertisement is de-
ceptive, especially where Congress has expressly empowered an expert agency with
exclusive federal jurisdiction to police such conduct."). In addition to national
uniformity, the preemption doctrine benefits patients. See Daniel E. Troy, The Pa-
tient's Interest in FDA Preemption, 1-5 (Mar. 31, 2006) (unpublished article), available
at http://www.federalismproject.org/preemption/papers/TroyPatientsInterest_
inFDAPreemption.pdf (discussing how preemption serves "long-term health in-
terest of all Americans" by "encourag[ing] the development of new drugs,
preserv [ing] the availability of existing drugs, reduc [ing] upward pressure on drug
prices, and assur[ing] rational prescribing").
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should be adopted and employed by the courts in prescription drug adver-
tisement cases based on an FDA-approved label.
Diana Rabeh
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss4/5
